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Abstract 
Concerns about the potential negative effects on domestic firms’ international competitiveness and 
ensuing carbon leakage are the main obstacle to the unilateral use of carbon pricing for reducing 
greenhouse gas emissions. Since 2005, the EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) has put a price on 
about half of the EU’s overall emissions and presently remains the largest cap-and-trade scheme in the 
world. Monitoring the competitiveness effects of the EU ETS is vital for evaluating the cost 
effectiveness of the policy instrument and for amending it if needed. This paper surveys the econometric 
literature that tests for the occurrence of competitiveness effects and carbon leakage under the EU ETS. 
Emphasised is the specific or more general relevance of estimation results for sectors, countries and 
years. Organised in this way, the empirical evidence may better inform policy. The review also covers 
several studies analysing the competitiveness effects of the EU ETS through the lens of stock markets. 
By far, the most frequently encountered conclusion is that no evidence was found of negative statistically 
significant effects on firms’ competitiveness (nor, therefore, of carbon leakage). Among the few adverse 
effects, those concerning increased FDI activity in certain regulated sectors deserve special 
consideration. 
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1. Introduction 
The EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) is the cornerstone of the EU’s strategy for decarbonising 
its economy. In operation since 2005, it presently remains the largest cap-and-trade scheme in the world. 
The EU ETS imposes a cap on overall emissions of carbon dioxide, nitrous oxide and perfluorocarbons 
from over 11,000 heavy energy-using and electricity-generating installations and airlines, covering 
about 45% of the EU’s overall greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. At any given moment, the market of 
emission allowances sets a single price for the emissions falling under the scheme. This, in theory, 
guarantees that cheaper opportunities for emission abatement are exploited first1.  
Whether implemented through carbon taxation or through emissions trading, as with the EU ETS, 
the main rationale for carbon pricing is indeed cost effectiveness in reducing emissions (Baumol and 
Oates, 1971). However, the experience with the implementation of carbon pricing has generally proved 
difficult or contentious at the least. Most notably, concerns about the potential negative effects on 
domestic firms’ international competitiveness, due to increased production costs, are a major obstacle 
to the unilateral use, or to the deeper unilateral use, of carbon pricing. Competitiveness deterioration 
also implies that the environmental effectiveness of the policy is affected, as in some measure additional 
emissions will be generated overseas. The mere displacement of emissions, due to their regulation, is 
called carbon leakage2. The EU ETS is no exception in facing these challenges. Their importance is well 
reflected in the history of the EU ETS, its working and the relevant policy debate3.  
While the concerns about detrimental effects on international competitiveness and related carbon 
leakage are perfectly legitimate, economic theory itself is not unequivocal as to whether such effects are 
certain outcomes of unilateral carbon pricing. The negative impact of tightening environmental 
regulation on exports or, over the longer term, on industry location is known as Pollution Haven Effect. 
In contrast with it, the Porter Hypothesis (Porter and van der Linde, 1995) suggests that market-based 
environmental policies, by spurring new production processes and products, may in fact lead to 
improved competitiveness. Does empirical evidence generally support the Porter Hypothesis? There is 
no consensus (Brännlund and Lundgren, 2009; Ambec et al., 2013; Dechezleprêtre and Sato, 2017). In 
any case, however, carbon pricing can be accompanied by specific measures to guard against potentially 
adverse effects. In the EU ETS, the free allocation of emission allowances is used for just this purpose. 
In the last decade, a large econometric literature has accumulated examining evidence of 
competitiveness effects caused by the EU ETS. Only two studies (Dechezlepretre et al., 2015 and 
Naegele and Zaklan, 2017), as far as we are aware, directly test for evidence of carbon leakage; that is, 
for whether emissions increased outside the EU as a consequence of the EU ETS. While the Pollution 
Haven Effect vs Porter Hypothesis debate permeates this whole literature, the same studies necessarily 
deal in some way with the more specific question of whether the EU ETS net-of-free-allowances has 
affected businesses. Free allocation remains a central feature of the EU ETS and a determinant of its 
performance. Its calibration, including the progressive replacement with auctioning, has been a matter 
at the heart of most regulatory interventions. Thus, it is important to understand whether different sectors 
have suffered any loss of competitiveness due to the EU ETS, despite free allocation, or viceversa, have 
benefited from regulation, possibly (but not necessarily) thanks to free allocation. 
                                                     
1 All official documentation and any relevant information on the functioning of the EU ETS can be found on the website of 
the European Commission’s DG Clima (www.ec.europa.eu/clima/).  
2 Competitiveness deterioration is not the only channel through which carbon leakage may occur. If the region adopting more 
stringent carbon regulation is sufficiently important in terms of demand for fossil fuels, carbon leakage may also result 
from lower global fossil fuel prices. 
3 Ellerman et al. (2010) is the reference book for the genesis and the development of the EU ETS in its first five years of 
operation. 
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This chapter offers a comprehensive review of the literature at hand. Any studies that present relevant 
econometric estimations and meet acceptable quality standards are considered4. The main goal of the 
review is to identify robust findings, while qualifying for the generality of individual results. Unlike 
previous literature reviews with a focus on the competitiveness effects of the EU ETS (notably, Martin 
et al., 2016), we emphasise the specific or more general relevance of estimation results for sectors, 
countries and years. We deem that by making these distinctions as clearly as possible, better weighted 
and hence more accurate conclusions can be drawn based on the different outcomes. Organised in this 
way, the existing empirical evidence may better inform policy. Moreover, it may make more obvious 
where empirical evidence is limited or missing. 
The first part of the review covers several works that, taken together, consider a range of economic 
performance indicators (e.g., exports, profits, sales, number of employees and productivity measures) 
and employ various econometric approaches. As Dechezleprêtre and Sato (2017) point out, there is, as 
yet, no single accepted test or measure of the competitiveness effects of environmental regulation, so 
the literature continues to use a variety of outcome measures linked to competitiveness. The second part 
of the review covers, by contrast, a rather homogenous body of literature that specifically infers 
investors’ appraisal of the influence of the EU ETS on firm competitiveness. It does so by analysing the 
effects of changes in the price of European Emission Allowances (EUAs) on returns on company stock 
prices. The EU ETS can be valued either as a net extra cost or as an opportunity for increased profits. 
The sector’s and firm’s characteristics and the extent of free allocation will determine which of these 
two. Unlike other competitiveness indicators, which measure realised outcomes, stock returns reflect 
investors’ expectations. For this reason, we refer to the first as conventional indicators and to the second 
as unconventional ones. As most of the works looking at stock returns are quite recent, only a few of 
them have been covered in previous literature reviews.  
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature considering 
conventional competitiveness indicators and the two studies testing for carbon leakage. Section 3 
reviews the literature analysing stock returns. Section 4 discusses the findings and concludes. 
2. Effects on conventional competitiveness indicators and evidence of carbon leakage 
The econometric literature assessing the competitiveness effects of the EU ETS is very diverse with 
respect to the variables used for measuring economic performance. It is also diverse with respect to the 
data, the methods and both the time and country coverage of the applications. With reference to the 
identified studies that consider conventional competitiveness indicators (in the sense specified), the first 
part of this section illustrates the choices made by the authors in each of these respects. For expository 
convenience, the two studies found that directly test for carbon leakage (Dechezleprȇtre et al., 2015 and 
Naegele and Zaklan, 2017) are considered together with this literature. 
Detailed accounts of the contents and the results of the same literature are subsequently provided5. 
The studies are presented according to whether the respective estimated effects are a) sector-generic, 
country-generic, b) sector-generic, country-specific, c) sector-specific, country-generic, or d) sector-
specific, country-specific6. We deem that the distinction between sector-generic and sector-specific 
effects is particularly expedient for policymaking. As understood in the rules for free allocation, the EU 
                                                     
4 Our search of the literature, which was carried out through the Google Scholar web search engine, terminated in December 
2017. 
5 A broader discussion of the evidence and of the relative implications of this literature is left to the paper’s conclusive 
section. 
6 We do not consider effects referring to the manufacturing sector as being sector-specific, since the manufacturing sector is 
too heterogeneous. However, effects referring to any manufacturing subsectors (distinguished by output) are considered 
sector-specific. 
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ETS legislation needs to carefully consider the different effects that the scheme has on different sectors7. 
This literature review shows, however, that the studies providing estimates of sector-specific effects are 
relatively few and together only cover few sectors. 
2.1 Mapping the literature: dependent variables, levels of analysis, methods, coverage 
The econometric applications in the literature presented in this section can vary from one to another 
across different dimensions. The following five are the main ones:  
1. Measure of competitiveness 
Several dependent variables are considered as alternative competitiveness indicators. This is 
possible because firms can respond to carbon pricing in different ways, notably through pricing-, 
production- and investment decisions, the effects of which, in turn, are detectable at different 
levels. These include sales, profits, the number of employees, exports, process or product 
innovations and changes in production capacity or location8.  
Table 1 – Surveyed literature (conventional competitiveness indicators): measures of 
competitiveness 
Variable Number of studies 
Productivity 7 
Trade 7 
Employment 6 
Profitability 4 
Turnover 3 
Value added 3 
Investment (FDIs included) 3 
Production costs 1 
 
2. Level of analysis 
Thanks to the increasing availability of micro-level data, most applications are at the installation 
level or, more often, at the firm level. Basic information on regulated installations is found in the 
EU Transaction Log (EUTL);9 and additional useful information can be drawn from external 
company databases (typically, private databases provided under license or public ones for 
administrative purposes) using firm identifiers. Fewer analyses are carried out at the sector level, 
which typically use time-series techniques. 
3. Approach 
Different approaches are used. The difference-in-differences (DiD) approach (with pre-treatment 
matching) has become by far the most popular. Its main attractiveness lies in the clearcut causal 
interpretation of the results around the impact of participation in the EU ETS – which in the 
control-treatment framework is the “treatment” – on the given dependent variable. Moreover, it 
allows for the capture of the final net effect of the EU ETS without having to specify a 
relationship (which is empirically difficult to identify) between EUA prices and the dependent 
                                                     
7 Arguably, heterogeneous effects across countries are easier to evaluate. Moreover, differently from business 
representatives, national governments participate first hand in the legislative process.  
8 Dechezleprêtre and Sato (2017) put some order into this collection of indicators by classifying the corresponding effects as 
first, second and third order, and distinguishing between firm responses, on the one hand, and economic, technology, 
international and environmental outcomes, on the other. 
9 The EUTL records official information both on regulated installations and allowance transactions in the EU ETS. The 
EUTL is accessible online at: http://ec.europa.eu/environment/ets/.  
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variable10. In the remaining applications, either time-series or panel-data models are employed. 
In the first case, the effect of the EU ETS is more specifically that of EUA prices. In the second, 
the effect usually refers to participation in the EU ETS, to EUA prices, or some measure of 
regulatory stringency.  
Table 2 – Surveyed literature (conventional competitiveness indicators): approach and level of 
analysis 
 Level of analysis  
Approach Firm (/plant) Sector Total 
Time series 0 4 4 
Panel data 3 2 5 
DiD 12 0 12 
Total 13 5 21 
 
4. Specificity of effects 
Some models provide estimates of sector- and/or country-specific effects, whereas others offer 
estimates of more general average effects. Importantly, models fitted to data from multiple 
countries or sectors do not necessarily provide estimates of multiple country- or sector-specific 
effects. While including binary variables controlling for country or sector fixed effects, they often 
limit themselves to estimating more general average effects that correspond to the scope of the 
sample. 
Table 3 – Surveyed literature (conventional competitiveness indicators): specificity of effects 
 Sector dimension  
Country dimension Sector-specific Sector-generic Total 
Country-specific 5 4 9 
Country-generic 7 5 12 
Total 12 9 21 
 
5. Time coverage 
Models are estimated using data spanning different time periods. This is particularly relevant 
considering the dynamic nature of the EU ETS, as reflected in the evolution of EUA prices, in 
its structure by trading period, as well as in the changes to its regulation. Most studies are based 
on datasets covering Phase I (2005-2007) or both Phases I and II (2008-2012). By contrast, 
surprisingly few studies, as of yet, draw on data stretching as far as Phase III (2013-2020).  
Table 4 – Time coverage of surveyed literature (conventional competitiveness indicators) 
Study 
Phase I Phase II Phase III 
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Reinaud (2008)                         
Commins et al. (2011)                         
Abrell et al. (2011)             
Costantini and Mazzanti (2012)                         
Sartor (2012)                         
                                                     
10 Typically, in the studies using the DiD approach, regulated firms or installations are first paired through statistical matching 
(e.g., through propensity score matching) with similar non-regulated counterparts. The model for the variable of interest is 
then fitted, including a binary variable among the regressors. This indicates whether the firm or installation participates in 
the EU ETS. The estimated coefficient of this variable measures the estimated effect of the EU ETS. For a technical 
overview of this and similar methods for policy evaluation, the reader is referred to Imbens and Wooldridge (2009). 
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Chan et al. (2013)                         
Yu (2013)                         
Petrick and Wagner (2014)                         
Wagner et al. (2014)                         
Lundgren et al. (2015)                         
Dechezleprêtre et al. (2015)*             
Marin et al. (2015)                         
Jaraite and Di Maria (2016)                         
Branger et al. (2016)                         
Klemetsen et al. (2016)                         
Lutz (2016)                         
Borghesi et al. (2016)                         
Koch and Basse Mama (2016)             
Löschel et al. (2016)             
Boutabba and Lardic (2017)                         
Naegele and Zaklan (2017)*             
* Study directly testing for carbon leakage. 
2.2 Detailed review 
2.2.1 Sector-generic, country-generic effects 
Using a large firm-level longitudinal dataset, mainly sourced from the Amadeus global company 
database (Bureau van Dijk), Commins et al. (2011) assess the effects of energy taxes and of the EU ETS 
on different competitiveness indicators. Four panel data models are estimated for firm-level: a) 
employment; b) tangible investment; c) total factor productivity (TFP); and c) return on capital (ROC), 
over 1996-2007. In each model, the effect of the EU ETS is captured by a binary variable, indicating 
whether the firm’s main business is in one of the regulated sectors. Participation in the EU ETS is found 
to have negative effects both on TFP (-3.2%) and ROC (-4.7%). Conversely, the effect on employment 
is positive (1.5%). All these effects, however, are statistically significant only at the 10% level. 
Moreover, since participation in the EU ETS is defined at the sector level11, measurement error is 
incurred and sectoral shocks may also confound estimations of the effects. The authors warn that the 
results are indicative. 
Costantini and Mazzanti (2012) estimate a sector-level gravity model of international trade for 
manufacturing exports from 15 EU countries to 145 importing countries, over 1996-2007. The effect of 
the EU ETS is captured by a binary variable for the years 2005-2007, which is the period corresponding 
to Phase I. Its estimated coefficient indicates that the EU ETS increased exports of medium-low 
technology sectors which roughly correspond to those covered by the EU ETS: thus, an outcome 
consistent with the Porter Hypothesis. The authors themselves, however, qualify this finding as being 
far from conclusive, stating that further sector disaggregation and longer time series are required to infer 
on the impact of the EU ETS on the competitiveness of regulated firms. 
Using firm-level data and applying the DiD approach, Marin et al. (2015) estimate the effects of the 
EU ETS on a large set of competitiveness indicators: value added; number of employees; turnover; 
investment; labour productivity; wages; return on investment (ROI); TFP; and markup. As in other 
studies in this literature, the Amadeus database is the main data source, providing information on the 
EU ETS firms and on matched counterparts. The samples used for estimation comprise between 
approximately 700 and 800 regulated firms (or fewer depending on any missing values of the variable 
analysed), from 2002 to 2012. The EU ETS appears to have positively influenced the scale of firms, as 
measured by turnover, employment and value added (14.9%, 8.2% and 6%, respectively, in Phase II). 
By contrast, negative effects, smaller in magnitude, are found for two scale-free variables, namely -2.4% 
                                                     
11 In a given sector, some firms participate in the EU ETS, while others do not. Notably, firms operating installations whose 
capacity is below the relevant threshold do not come under the EU ETS.  
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and -0.5% for, respectively, TFP and ROI, in Phase II. Some heterogeneity in effects across sectors and 
firms is also identified. The interactions with the treatment variable denoting participation in the EU 
ETS indicate that emission-intensive firms and sectors were generally penalised. On the other hand, 
consistent with the Porter Hypothesis, positive effects on labour productivity and on ROI are found for 
the interaction between participation in the EU ETS and (patent-based) environmental innovation. 
2.2.2 Sector-generic, country-specific effects12 
Wagner et al. (2014) assess the impacts of the EU ETS on GHG emissions and employment of regulated 
manufacturing firms in France. The DiD approach is applied to panels of administrative data comprising 
5,957 plants (384 regulated) and 4,589 firms (287 regulated), from 2000 to 2010. Sizeable effects on 
emissions are found for Phase II, which, however, differ depending on whether the analysis is conducted 
at the plant or at the firm level. In the first case, the authors find that the EU ETS reduced emissions by 
almost 20%; in the second, by half as much. Similarly, varying results are found for the effects on 
employment. At the plant level, Phase II turns out to have reduced employment by 7%; at the firm level, 
meanwhile, no statistically significant effects are found. Two possible explanations for these differences 
in results are: within-firm leakage, that is, firms shifting production from regulated to non-regulated 
plants; and measurement error13. The authors find evidence of only modest within-firm leakage, but 
warn that further testing is required. 
Petrick and Wagner (2014) estimate the impact of the EU ETS on CO2 emissions and CO2 intensity, 
as well as on employment, gross output (sales) and the exports of regulated manufacturing firms in 
Germany. The DiD approach is applied to firm-level panel data obtained from the national production 
census, covering over 90% of the EU ETS installations operated by manufacturing firms and located in 
Germany. About 400 regulated firms are in the estimation samples. In the reference model, the effects 
on employment are not statistically significant, while positive effects on the value of both sales and 
exports are identified for the first three years of Phase II (i.e., 2008-2010)14. The positive effects are 
clearly non-robust, however, as they become statistically insignificant in most of the alternative 
estimations performed.  
Jaraite and Di Maria (2016) estimate the impact of the EU ETS on CO2 emissions and CO2 intensity, 
as well as on the investment and the profitability of Lithuanian regulated firms. The DiD approach is 
applied to a panel dataset sourced from the national business survey, of almost 5,000 firms (about 330 
of which are regulated), from 2003 to 2010. Investment and profitability are measured by the change in 
total tangible capital assets and the ratio of before-tax profit to turnover, respectively. It turns out that, 
up to 2009, regulated firms invested, on average, less than non-regulated firms, but conversely, in 2010, 
they invested more. This may well be the consequence of a Lithuanian law passed in 2009, mandating 
that all revenues received from the sale of emission allowances should be spent on environmental 
measures. Negative effects on profitability, though statistically significant only at the 10% level, are 
detected in 2009 and 2010. This may be explained by allowance allocation in Phase II being much tighter 
for Lithuanian firms than in Phase I. 
Klemetsen et al. (2016) estimate the impact of the EU ETS on CO2 emissions and CO2 intensity, as 
well as on value added and labour productivity (value added per man hour) of Norwegian-regulated 
                                                     
12 Anger and Oberndorfer (2008) estimate the impact of relative allowance allocation, this being the ratio of allocated 
allowances to emissions, on revenues and on the employment of German regulated firms in 2005. The perspective is, 
therefore, slightly different from that of the studies surveyed here, which consider the effects of participation in the EU 
ETS, and not of relative allocation among regulated firms. The results indicate that relative allocation had no statistically 
significant effect on revenues or employment.  
13 Participation in the EU ETS is defined at the installation level, not at the firm level. 
14 The data do not allow for the disentangling of quantity and price variations.  
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manufacturing plants15. The DiD approach is applied to a plant-level panel dataset obtained by 
combining different datasets, the most important of which is compiled by the Norwegian Environment 
Agency. The sample eventually used for estimation comprises 152 plants (72 regulated), from 2001 to 
2013. Very large positive effects, though only for Phase II (when carbon prices were higher), are found 
both on value added and labour productivity: respectively, 24% and 26%. The authors relate these results 
to generally non-stringent allowance allocations and, also, to the pass-through (to output prices) of the 
connected opportunity costs.  
Borghesi et al. (2016) investigate whether Phases I and II had any effect on outward FDIs of regulated 
manufacturing firms in Italy. In this study, FDIs are measured by the number of foreign subsidiaries16. 
The DiD approach is applied to a longitudinal dataset extracted from the Aida database (Bureau van 
Dijk) of Italian companies, from 2002 to 2010. The samples used for estimations include treatment 
groups of about 300 regulated firms. Results show that, on average, firms in the EU ETS did not increase 
their presence in other countries. However, the interactions with the treatment variable, denoting 
participation in the EU ETS, reveal that firms operating in sectors particularly exposed to international 
competition increased their FDIs towards countries not covered by the EU ETS. This result may reflect 
a strategy by which regulated firms attempt to stay competitive in the market. 
Similarly to Borghesi et al. (2016), Koch and Basse Mama (2016) test for whether the EU ETS 
affected FDI stocks outside the EU of regulated (almost exclusively, manufacturing) firms in 
Germany17. The DiD approach is applied to a panel of firm survey data (Deutsche Bundesbank) spanning 
1999-2013 (within which 232 regulated firms are identified). When using the full sample, no statistically 
significant effects are found across the three trading periods. This is the primary result, which speaks to 
exaggerated concerns about carbon leakage through relocation. Subsample analysis, however, reveals 
that the EU ETS increased (by as much as 50%) FDI activity of firms in “non-process” regulated sectors 
(notably, the machinery, electrical equipment and automotive sectors). Compared to “process” regulated 
sectors, non-process ones are characterised by lower capital intensities18. For this reason, the latter are 
more geographically mobile. 
2.2.3 Sector-specific, country-generic effects 
Abrell et al. (2011) have the merit of being the first to use the DiD approach in an application to the EU 
ETS. The study draws on a large dataset extracted from the Amadeus company database. The dataset 
covers over 2,000 regulated firms (operating about 3,600 installations), from 2003 to 2008. Separate 
models for CO2 emissions, added value, employment and profit margin are fitted. Average impacts of 
the EU ETS on regulated firms are found to be not statistically significant, with the exception of a small 
negative effect (0.9%) on employment over 2004-2008. Some heterogeneity in estimated average effects 
arises when the models are fitted to widely-defined sector sub-samples19. Notably, the profit margins of 
firms in the energy sector (electricity and heat) benefit from participation in the EU ETS. By contrast, 
firms producing non-metallic mineral products (e.g., glass, cement, ceramics, bricks) are negatively 
affected. The authors warn that the results should be interpreted with caution: firstly, because firms in 
the treatment and control groups (while similar with respect to a number of variables) operate in different 
sectors; secondly, because the potential indirect effects (of the EU ETS through electricity prices) on 
firms in the control groups are ignored. 
                                                     
15 Norway joined the EU ETS in 2008. 
16 Available information on the economic relevance of the subsidiaries is too scarce to be used.  
17 The analysis only considers firms that have invested abroad. 
18 “Process” sectors are those regulated through process-specific capacity thresholds. The “non-process” sectors are regulated 
due to combustion activities. 
19 Four sector subsamples are considered: “Paper and paper products”, “Non-metallic mineral products”, “Basic metals” and 
“Electricity and heat”. 
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The study by Chan et al. (2013) is similar to Abrell et al.’s (2011) both in terms of the data used and 
approach. The main methodological difference is that matched firms, in the treatment group and in the 
control group, here belong to the same sector20. As to the scope of the analysis, three sectors are 
examined: electricity; cement; and iron and steel. For each of them, three competitiveness indicators are 
considered: unit material cost (i.e., the ratio of total material costs to turnover); employment; and 
turnover. Statistically significant effects are found only for the electricity sector, which exhibits 
increases both in unit material cost (by 5% and 8% in Phases I and II, respectively) and, more 
substantially, in turnover (by 30% in Phase II). The authors conjecture that the increase in material costs 
may be related to compliance costs (i.e. the cost of purchasing allowances) or fuel switching from coal 
to gas. The larger increase in turnover would reflect the carbon cost pass-through to output prices.  
Branger et al. (2016) and Boutabba and Lardic (2017) deal with the impact of the EU ETS on the 
competitiveness of the cement and the steel industries. Both contributions model EU27’s net imports of 
the two products applying time-series regression techniques. In Branger et al. (2016), both the effects 
of EUA prices on net imports of cement and of steel are not statistically significant. Boutabba and Lardic 
(2017) revisit Branger et al.’s (2016) analysis applying a rolling cointegration approach, which accounts 
for multiple structural changes, and uses longer data series updated with more recent information. The 
EUA prices are found, for both cement and steel to have (time-varying) effects on net imports that are 
positive and statistically significant for some subperiods. The authors interpret the results as suggesting 
that modest operational leakage took place, and that it was more evident in the steel sector than in the 
cement sector. 
Using similar approaches to those of the two aforementioned studies on steel and cement, Reinaud 
(2008) and Sartor (2012) investigate the impact of the EU ETS on the competitiveness of the primary 
aluminium sector. Direct emissions from (both primary and secondary) aluminium production came 
under the EU ETS only in 2013, with the start of Phase III. However, as primary aluminium is an 
electricity-intensive product (electricity represents over a third of total production costs), the impact of 
the EU ETS on the sector is principally felt indirectly through electricity prices21. In Reinaud’s (2008) 
preliminary regression of the EU’s net imports of primary aluminium, only the first two years of the EU 
ETS are covered. She finds the effect of EUA prices not to be statistically significant. The main 
explanation offered is that electricity used in primary aluminium production was most often provided 
under long-term electricity contracts, shielding aluminium producers from rising electricity costs. Sartor 
(2012) extends Reinaud’s (2008) analysis, using longer data series, which reach 2011 (by when many 
electricity contracts were expected to have expired), and controlling for both additional variables and 
cointegration. The findings, nevertheless, confirm those of the previous study. They suggest that other 
factors are much more important than the carbon price in determining the competitiveness of the primary 
aluminium sector: energy prices, electricity contracts and other factors driving electricity prices, as well 
as exchange rate movements.  
2.2.4 Sector-specific, country-specific effects 
Yu (2013) estimates the impact of the EU ETS on profit margins (ratio of net profits to the turnover) of 
Swedish firms in the energy sector (electricity production, electricity distribution, steam and hot water 
                                                     
20 This excludes the risk of estimated effects being biased by different trends in the sectors to which the firms in treatment 
and control groups would belong. On the other hand, it risks firms which should be in the treatment group ending up in the 
control group. Abrell et al. (2011) warn that this can happen if participating firms are not identified in the company 
database.  
21 In the primary production process, aluminium oxide is produced from bauxite and further processed to aluminium via 
electrolysis. Secondary aluminium is produced using recycled scrap. Its electricity intensity is about 5% of that required to 
produce primary aluminium. 
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supply), in 2005 and 2006. The DiD approach (with and without matching22) is applied to a panel dataset, 
extracted from Statistics Sweden’s business database, comprising almost 1,000 firms (113 regulated), 
from 2004 to 2006. The estimation results do not show a statistically significant impact for the EU ETS 
on firm profitability in 2005. However, a negative significant impact (1.1 percentage point decrease in 
the profit margin ratio) is found for the following year. The results are tentatively interpreted in light of 
carbon prices and machinery investments (a proxy for abatement investments). Notably, an increase in 
machinery investment is observed in 2006 only for regulated firms.  
Lundgren et al. (2015) assess the effects of the EU ETS (as well as of the Swedish energy and carbon 
taxes) on the TFP of Swedish pulp-and-paper sector firms. A firm-level panel dataset (supplied by 
Statistics Sweden) is used, of some 100 firms over 1998-2008. Their approach involves two steps. Firm-
specific Luenberger indicators of TFP growth are first computed23, distinguishing between: a) efficiency 
change; and b) technological development. In the second step, the impact of the EU ETS carbon price 
on TFP growth is estimated, using a dynamic panel data approach. Interestingly, carbon prices are found 
to have a positive effect on efficiency change and, conversely, a negative one on technological 
development. The latter result is in line with those of Commins et al. (2011) above.  
Lutz (2016) estimates the impact of the EU ETS on the TFP of regulated manufacturing firms in 
Germany. Using firm-level administrative data comprising about 15,000 firms (of which about 400 are 
regulated), for the period 1999 to 2012, industry-specific production functions are first estimated and 
firm-specific productivity levels are then derived. The DiD approach, with and without matching, is then 
applied. Positive effects on productivity are detected. Specifically, for Phase I, 0.7% and 1.5-2.7%, 
without and with matching, respectively; and for Phase II, 1.2-1.4%, only with matching. Moreover, 
subsample analysis (presented only for DiD without matching) reveals some heterogeneous effects 
across sectors: a positive one (2.4%) for basic metals in Phase I; while no statistically significant effects 
are found for the food, paper, and chemical industries. The author warns, however, that, since the 
productivity measure employed is revenue-based, the results may at least in part reflect pass-through of 
regulation costs.  
Using data and methods similar to those employed by Lutz (2016), Löschel et al. (2016) investigate 
whether the EU ETS had any impact on production efficiency of regulated manufacturing firms in 
Germany. In this study, the firm-level distance to the estimated sector-specific production frontier is the 
relevant measure of economic performance24. Across the array of modeling strategies, no evidence is 
found of negative effects of the EU ETS on efficiency. On the contrary, the EU ETS is found to have 
had a positive impact for firms in the paper sector (-1.3% and -1.6% over 2003-2007 and 2003-2012, 
respectively) and, in general, on regulated firms during the first year (only) of Phase I.  
2.2.5 Carbon leakage 
Dechezleprêtre et al. (2015) are the first to directly test for carbon leakage caused by the EU ETS. That 
is, instead of testing for competitiveness effects and assuming that those would have resulted in carbon 
leakage, shifts in emission locations are directly analysed. An ingenious strategy is put to work, made 
viable by a special database. The Carbon Disclosure Project (www.cdp.net) collects climate-relevant 
data at the firm level, including on the emissions of multinational firms broken down by country. As 
they already operate from multiple locations, multinational firms are believed to be the most prone to 
shift production activity across countries and, hence, to carbon leakage. Using a sample covering 1,785 
companies (142 regulated), over 2007-2014, the authors test the relationship between changes in firms’ 
                                                     
22 The authors state that the results with matching are similar, but they are not shown in the paper (they are available from the 
authors upon request).  
23 The Luenberger indicators are computed based on directional distance functions using data envelopment analysis, which 
is a non-parametric linear programming technique. 
24 A negative effect represents a move toward the efficient production frontier (i.e., an increase in production efficiency). 
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European share of their own emissions and changes in their extra-EU emissions share. Existence of 
carbon leakage would imply that such relationships would be negative. No negative effects are found. 
The authors note, however, that region-specific productivity shocks could potentially confound the 
estimated effects of the EU ETS. 
Naegele and Zaklan (2017) investigate whether the EU ETS caused carbon leakage in European 
manufacturing sectors, as measured by changes in sector-level international trade flows and related 
carbon movements. Sector-level trade flows in embodied carbon and value are computed using detailed 
trade and input-output data (from the Global Trade Analysis Project) for the years 2004, 2007 and 2011. 
Two models are estimated, namely for net imports and for bilateral flows (thus allowing for intra-
industry trade) and four alternative measures of environmental stringency are considered for 
representing the EU ETS. The simplest of these measures is an indicator variable for regulated sectors, 
while the others are (sector-specific) “direct”-, “indirect”-, and “total net” costs based on emissions 
(direct/indirect), allowance allocations and allowance prices. As no significant effects are found, the 
authors conclude that, during its first two phases, the EU ETS did not have a systematic impact on flows 
of trade or embodied CO2 emissions. 
3. Effects on stock returns 
Taking a radically different approach from the literature reviewed in Section 2, several studies analyse 
the competitiveness effects of the EU ETS through the lens of stock markets. Assuming that a firm’s 
stock price reflects its stream of expected discounted future profits, the effect of changes in EUA prices 
on stock price returns reveals investors’ beliefs about the influence of the EU ETS on profitability. 
Specifically, a direct (/inverse/no) relationship between carbon prices and stock prices indicates that 
investors see the EU ETS as having a net positive (negative/no) effect on profits. Crucially, this effect 
varies across sectors and firms depending on the respective characteristics and on the proportion of 
emissions covered by free allowances. Indeed, the typical exercise in this literature consists in testing 
for differing effects across such dimensions. 
Considering the mechanisms underlying the Porter Hypothesis, but also more sophisticated ones 
(e.g., restricting entry, raising rivals’ costs), the impact of carbon pricing on profits is not predictable 
with any certainty. In this sense, free allocation in a cap-and-trade scheme adds a layer of complexity. 
Free allocation introduces two channels through which firms can increase revenues and by which it can 
potentially increase profits; the latter meaning that the revenue increase following carbon pricing 
exceeds the production cost increase. The first channel is the pass-through of opportunity costs (the costs 
associated with the use of free allowances for compliance) to output prices. With positive carbon prices, 
depending on its ability to pass-through (at no expense of market shares or profits) and on its endowment 
of free allowances relative to emissions, a firm increases revenues and possibly profits. The second 
channel refers to the extra revenues that can be obtained from selling unused allowances. Thus, an 
increase in carbon prices will have a positive (/negative) effect on profits if the revenue effects operating 
through the said two channels dominate (/are dominated by) the increase in production costs. By the 
same token, a decrease in carbon prices will have a negative (/positive) effect on profits if the negative 
revenue effects dominate (/are dominated by) the decrease in production costs. Any of these variations 
in carbon prices equally indicates that investors see the EU ETS as having a net positive (/negative) 
effect on profits. 
The literature in question presents itself as quite homogeneous in methodological terms. The use of 
the multifactor market model (MMM) is typical, in which daily (or monthly) returns on a firm’s stock 
are explained by those returns on the market portfolio and on other prices deemed to be relevant. These 
include carbon prices and fuel prices (e.g., coal, oil, gas). The basic MMM framework, applied to panel 
data, has the following form: 
𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + ∑ 𝛼𝑖𝐷𝑖
𝑗
𝑗 + 𝛽1𝑅𝑡
𝑚 + 𝛽2𝑅𝑡
𝑐 + ∑ 𝛾𝑗𝑅𝑡
𝑗
𝑗 + 𝜀 (1) 
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where: 𝑅𝑖 is the return on the stock of firm i; 𝐷𝑖 is a firm dummy variable (taking the value 1 when i = 
j); 𝑅𝑚 is the return on the market portfolio; 𝑅𝑐 is the return on emission allowances; and the 𝑅𝑗s are the 
returns on fuel prices.  
Most often daily returns are considered, while only a few studies use monthly data25. The number of 
companies varies greatly, from a dozen to about one hundred. More relevant elements of differentiation 
concern the estimation of effects that vary across sectors, firms or trading periods. Early contributions 
tend to focus on the electricity sector, within which they distinguish dirtier from cleaner firms (defined 
according to the carbon intensity of the generation fuel mix). More recent studies tend to extend the 
analysis to other sectors and can draw on data covering the first years of the third trading period. This is 
important, given the fundamental change in the allowance allocation regime brought in with Phase III. 
Moreover, the most significant variations on the standard MMM approach are represented by event 
studies (exploiting the April 2006 crash of EUA prices) and the extension to vector co-integration. 
In the following, the identified literature (Table 5) is described in greater detail. The studies looking 
exclusively at stocks of companies in the electricity sector are first considered. We then turn to those 
extending the analysis to multiple sectors. 
Table 5 – Time coverage of surveyed literature (stock market) 
Study 
Phase I Phase II Phase III 
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Oberndorfer (2009)                         
Veith et al. (2009)                         
Mo et al. (2012)                         
Bushnell et al. (2013)                         
Jong et al. (2014)                         
Scholtens et al. (2014)                         
Oestreich and Tsiakas (2015)                         
Venmans (2015)                         
Pereira da Silva et al. (2015)                         
Tian et al. (2016)                         
Pereira da Silva et al. (2016)                         
Moreno and Pereira da Silva (2016)                         
3.1 Electricity sector (exclusively) 
Oberndorfer (2009) and Veith et al. (2009) are the first to analyse the effect of changes in EUA prices 
on stock returns. The two studies present similarities beyond the MMM approach. Though the samples 
differ somewhat in the number of companies (12 and 2226, in Oberndorfer and in Veith et al., 
respectively), their time spans largely coincide (August 2005 – June 2007 and April 2005 – August 
2007, in the same order). Above all, the analyses share the main outcome: on average, changes in carbon 
prices and in stock prices were positively correlated. Deeper analyses offer additional results and 
insights. Notably, Oberndorfer (2009) finds that effects varied by time and by country (where companies 
have their headquarters). On a different level, Veith et al. (2009) find that increases in carbon prices did 
not have a positive effect on carbon-free generation companies27. 
                                                     
25 Monthly data can be preferable as there is less noise in their information. However, the tradeoff is with the number of 
available observations, which, of course, are many fewer than with monthly data.  
26 Perhaps, even 22 companies may seem a small number to some. However, those considered by Veith et al. (2009) represent 
almost two thirds of total electricity generation in Europe and account for about one third of all emissions under the EU 
ETS. 
27 This is unexpected as, even in the short term, carbon-free generators benefit from higher electricity prices by reaping 
inframarginal rents. 
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Mo et al. (2012) mainly extend the analysis of previous works by comparing estimated effects across 
trading periods. The estimation sample covers the years 2006 to 2009, thus straddling Phases I and II. 
The authors find that, on average, correlation between changes in carbon prices and in stock prices was 
positive in the first trading period (as in both Oberndorfer, 2009 and Veith et al., 2009) and, by contrast, 
it was negative in the second. Moreover, stock prices were much more sensitive to changes in carbon 
prices in Phase II than they were before. In both cases, differences are attributed to more stringent 
allowance allocations in Phase II.  
Further variations on the theme are provided by Tian et al. (2016) and by Pereira da Silva et al. 
(2016). The former, who can rely on a sample covering Phases I and II in full, show that the relationship 
between carbon prices and stock prices was largely driven by (two) specific shocks in the carbon market. 
Outside these special periods, the relationship depended on the carbon intensity of electricity producers: 
negative for carbon-intensive companies, positive for less carbon-intensive ones. Limiting the analysis 
to the Spanish stock market, but crucially drawing on data straddling Phases II and III, Pereira da Silva 
et al.’s (2016) extend the standard MMM approach to vector cointegration. Applying a cointegrated 
Vector Error Correction Model (VECM), which allows for a control on dynamic interactions among 
variables, the authors find that: the equilibrium relationship between carbon prices and stock prices was 
(weak, but) positive in Phase II; and statistically non-significant in Phase III. This result fits well with 
the switch from free allocation to full auctioning for the electricity sector. Moreover, the above positive 
relationship is found to be significantly stronger for the subset of clean energy producers.  
3.2 Multiple sectors 
Bushnell et al.’s (2013) study stands out in this literature for adapting the standard MMM approach to 
the form of an event study, as well as for the depth of analysis. The abrupt April 2006 fall in EUA prices, 
following the disclosure of 2005 verified emissions28, had immediate repercussions on the European 
stock market. Focusing on a three-day window (April 26-28), the authors examine the changes in stock 
returns, across sectors and firms, to elicit investors’ beliefs about the influence of the EU ETS on firms’ 
profitability. As a result of the crash in carbon prices, stock prices fell for firms in energy-intensive 
sectors, particularly for those selling primarily within the EU. In the electricity sector, price stocks of 
less carbon-intensive producers were more affected than those of dirtier ones. Data variation is not 
sufficient for identifying an effect of allowance holdings (emissions and allowances are highly 
correlated), but findings are unaffected when allowance holdings are considered. The main conclusion 
of the study is that, under free allocation29, investors focused on increasing profits through higher output 
prices. Analysing the same market event and using a similar approach, Jong et al. (2014) find evidence 
confirming the stronger negative impact of the fall in carbon prices on dirtier firms. 
Also the studies not restricted to the energy sector mostly use the standard MMM approach. 
Prominent among them is Oestreich and Tsiakas (2015). Using monthly data from the German stock 
market, the authors provide compelling evidence on the role of the allocation method in affecting the 
relative financial performance of different firms. The comparison between the average excess returns of 
“dirty” firms, who received the largest amounts of free allowances, and those of “clean” ones, who did 
not receive any, is unequivocal. Namely, before 2005, no difference can be detected; then, dirty firms 
significantly outperformed clean firms, but only up to March 2009: when the second ETS Directive 
stipulated that allowances would be mainly auctioned beginning in 2013. After March 2009, clean firms 
outperformed dirty ones.  
Venmans (2015) contributes firm and sector-specific estimates of correlations between changes in 
EUA prices and in stock prices. These refer to all companies in the StoxxEurope Total Market Index 
                                                     
28 On 25 April, the first reports on country-level emissions began to leak into the market. As the excess supply of allowances 
became obvious, carbon prices fell from €28/tCO2 on 25 April to €14 on 28 April.  
29 In Phase I (and in subsequent Phase II), almost all allowances were given away for free.  
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belonging to EU ETS sectors, over the period 2007-2011. Mean effects are positive for all seven sectors 
under consideration. The least important effects are found for the electricity, refining and the paper 
sectors; intermediate effects are found for the cement and chemicals sectors, whereas the iron and steel 
and the nonferrous sectors present the largest effects. However, the study emphasises that effects are 
firm specific and that variation within sectors can be significant. Out of 97 firms, 19-24 (depending on 
the model) exhibit negative effects. Within the electricity sector, less carbon-intensive firms, as 
expected, benefit more from carbon price increases. 
Focusing on the Spanish stock market, Pereira da Silva et al. (2015) apply the VECM variant of the 
MMM approach to firms in five different sectors: electricity; refining; iron and steel; pulp and paper; 
and, finally, the cement, ceramics and glass sectors taken together. The estimation sample is short in 
time, as it only covers (and not in full) the first two years of Phase III (2013-2014). Estimated effects 
are positive for all sectors, except for the iron and steel and for the pulp and paper sectors; here they are, 
respectively, negative and statistically not different from zero. Using the standard MMM approach, 
Moreno and Pereira da Silva (2016) extend the analysis by including full Phase II and by adding 
companies in the chemicals sector. Effects are shown to be both sector and phase-specific. Unlike other 
studies, negative effects are found for the electricity sector. The only sector for which positive effects 
are found in both trading periods is the refining sector30. 
4. Discussion and conclusions 
The empirical literature on the competitiveness effects of the EU ETS and related carbon leakage is wide 
and growing. Yet, only two studies were found directly testing for carbon leakage; that is, testing for 
whether emissions increased outside the EU as a consequence of the EU ETS31. This is the case 
principally because econometric identification of carbon leakage presents additional empirical 
challenges (greater data requirements to begin with) compared to identification of competitiveness 
effects. Within the reviewed literature, two main sets of works have been identified. The first considers 
a range of conventional indicators measuring economic outcomes linked to competitiveness, such as 
profits, exports, sales, employment and productivity. The second looks at the stock market to infer 
whether investors believe the EU ETS is beneficial or detrimental to profits. Though the respective 
approaches are very different, the two bodies of literature complement each other nicely. Their recurring 
findings are largely consistent, thus, allowing for some robust conclusions. Nevertheless, especially 
considering the information needs of policymakers, significant gaps remain. 
By far, the most frequently encountered conclusion is that no evidence was found of negative 
statistically significant effects of the EU ETS on firms’ competitiveness (nor, therefore, of carbon 
leakage). Moderate to very low carbon prices are the first obvious suspect for this outcome. However, 
the role of generous free allocation, especially considering firms’ differing abilities to pass through 
opportunity costs of emission allowances, is not less important. A few negative effects have been found, 
but most of them are characterised by uncertainty greater than ideal (i.e. estimated effects are statistically 
significant only at the 10% level) or are accompanied by words of caution due to specific data or 
methodological issues. Besides, a large diversity in the competitiveness indicators deployed means that 
a particular variable for which negative effects are more frequently detected does not exist. Nevertheless, 
while any significant effects should be carefully considered, two recent studies prompt a warning that, 
perhaps, should receive special attention. Namely, Borghesi et al. (2016) and Koch and Basse Mama 
                                                     
30 The refining sector is characterised by very high cost pass-through rates, close to 100% (see, e.g., de Bruyn et al., 2010 and 
de Bruyn et al., 2015). 
31 None of these applications can produce empirical estimates of carbon leakage rates (i.e., the share of locally abated 
emissions compensated by increased emissions overseas). To do this, one would need a structural model allowing for the 
simulation of a counterfactual world without carbon pricing (Aichele and Felbermayr, 2015).  
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(2016), both find evidence of greater FDI activity, respectively, in Italy’s and Germany’s regulated 
sectors most exposed to international competition and less capital intensive.  
Positive effects are more frequently found, but, crucially, they are almost exclusively explained by 
windfall profits (whether via pass-through of carbon costs, allowance overallocation or inframarginal 
rents) rather than by increased productivity and larger market shares. Indeed, it remains unclear whether 
the EU ETS made firms in any sectors or subsectors more competitive through innovation or efficiency 
improvements, the mechanisms underlying the Porter Hypothesis32. By contrast, some of the studies 
analysing stock returns are particularly effective in showing that the combination of free allocation and 
the pass-through of opportunity costs resulted in profit increases. They do so through comparisons of 
estimated effects: a) between regulated and non-regulated sectors; b) between dirtier and cleaner 
producers within the electricity sector; and c) across the first two trading periods and Phase III, Phase 
III marking the switch from almost full free allocation to auctioning as the main allocation method. 
Finally, the conclusions that can be drawn from this literature present three orders of limits, all of 
which are, at least in part, explained by empirical difficulties. First, most empirical analyses still only 
refer to Phases I and II. This delay might have some relevance considering the changes that have taken 
place since the start of Phase III, notably the changed allocation regime. But developments external to 
the EU ETS (e.g., the economic context, technology, climate policies in other world regions) need also 
to be taken into account. Second, distinct estimates of sector-specific effects are few. With reference to 
the literature considering conventional competitiveness indicators, we found: three estimates for the 
cement sector; three for the iron and steel sector; three for the energy sector (for which carbon leakage 
risk is minimal); two for aluminium; two for paper; and one or, more often, none for all other sectors33. 
While scarce in number, sector-specific estimates seem to us particularly valuable, as they are suited to 
inform policy, not least possible revisions of the EU ETS. Third, with few exceptions, existing estimates 
of competitiveness effects refer only to short-term effects. However, the most relevant economic losses 
that unilateral carbon pricing might cause would unfold over the long term, if expected or protracted 
competitiveness deterioration affected investment decisions. In other words, through industry relocation 
or what is commonly referred to as investment leakage.  
  
                                                     
32 Some studies notably, Calel and Dechezleprêtre (2015), find that the EU ETS had significant positive effects on low-carbon 
innovation (for a survey of the relevant literature, see Rogge, 2016). However, whether these resulted in net gains in 
competitiveness is a different question.  
33 In some cases, two-digit NACE sectors are still too heterogenous for the corresponding estimates to be of real use for 
policy.  
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